Trust and Organization: Integrating Responses to Freshwater Contamination within the Everyday Work of a Care Organization by Sparf, Jörgen
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors




the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books






Trust and Organization: Integrating Responses to
Freshwater Contamination within the Everyday Work
of a Care Organization
Jörgen Sparf
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.75532
© 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 
 
dditional infor ation is available at the end of the chapter
Abstract
In order to cut the word count I rewrote the entire abstract. Please replace with: Crisis 
management literature regularly focuses on large-scale incidents, crisis management orga-
nizations, and a managerial top-down approach. In reality, many crisis situations are small 
scale and local, involve non-emergency organizations, and often affect the entire organiza-
tion. This chapter addresses this lacuna by fleshing out the empirical case of the outbreak 
of a waterborne parasite in a small municipality in Northern Sweden. The analysis showed 
that the outbreak affected the whole organization and was managed by the active agency 
of operative personnel and central experts. Additionally, findings suggest that spheres 
of action and different time-spatial framings were decisive elements in managing the cri-
sis. The study concludes that issues of trust and the organizational setting influenced the 
framing and handling of the outbreak. In particular, the level of vertically directed trust 
established before the outbreak, along with the relatively high independence of the differ-
ent units at operational level, played a decisive role in the integration of the outbreak in the 
everyday work of the organization. The paper calls for the development of organization 
theory addressing non-emergency organizations, small-scale events, and the integration 
of adverse events in the formal and social structures of everyday work.
Keywords: crisis management literature, organization theory, open systems, social 
structures, active agency
1. Introduction
Studies in crisis management usually analyze how single cases occur in specific organizations 
and how they are sealed off (‘siloed’) from ordinary production by top-level management or 
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
technical experts [1]. Much less attention has focused on how incidents are addressed through 
organizations, how ordinary personnel at different levels deal with the incident, and how 
they relate the incidents to their ordinary work. In addition, most research seems to primar-
ily examine incidents within production or directly stemming from production. Apart from 
disasters and dramatic incidents, studies of external events are rare. This paper takes a dif-
ferent approach in examining precisely this kind of organizational addressing in a non-emer-
gency organization, during an external and small kind of incident.
In reviewing the literature on crisis management for this paper, three major problems were 
identified. Firstly, Smith [2] states that existing studies mainly focus on large-scale hazards 
such as natural or technical disasters, big accidents and major emergencies. The theoretical 
development of crisis management “has been based upon the processes that surround severe 
cases or extreme events rather than more ‘normal’ forms of adverse events that can result in 
crises for organizations” ([2], p. 101). The preponderance of large-scale hazards has not only 
limited the theoretical development but has also led to a lack of practical knowledge appli-
cable to local incidents and small-scale emergencies.
Secondly, there is a conspicuous lack of common organizations as objects of study. The 
object of study in existing studies is either clear-cut or ‘manifest’ [3], crisis organizations 
such as emergency organizations and rescue services, or High Reliability Organizations 
[4–7] and more recently, integrated operations [8]. The staffs in these organizations regu-
larly deal with a range of uncertainties and disturbances. Almost all of their work consists 
of monitoring and avoiding risks, and dealing with emergencies. They therefore have the 
professional knowledge, equipment, training and skills to resolve incidents [9]. However, 
what is missing are studies on latent crisis organizations [3, 10], i.e. organizations in which 
emergency or rescue responses are not part of the work, and where the staff are not explic-
itly trained to deal with uncertainties and disruptions-in other words, any other common 
organization.
Thirdly, the literature does not describe how crises are handled concretely at different orga-
nizational levels. The majority of crisis management studies focus on managerial aspects 
of crises, rather than on theoretical exploration [11]. However, the managerial aspects are 
presented in an abstract way, most often from a top-down perspective and with no actual 
actions of the staff described. Also, they are often limited to focusing response and recovery 
activities [12]. The number of managerial and strategic tools is huge [11, 13–15] but they fail 
to provide knowledge on how crises materialize and are dealt with from an organizational 
perspective, i.e. how changes and adaptations are actually carried out by the staff as active 
agents, and how the changes are integrated within the formal and social structures of the 
organization.
The aim of this paper is to examine how the interplay between trust and the organizational 
setting might influence the framing and management of an uncertain, adverse event at dif-
ferent organizational levels. The case study for this is a local outbreak of the water-borne 
parasite Cryptosporidium in Östersund, Sweden. Empirically the study investigates how the 
personnel at the local healthcare administration normalized the outbreak by assessing, man-
aging, and integrating the disturbance within the formal and social structures of everyday 
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work. Knowledge from the study could help building knowledge on how different levels in 
non-emergency organizations can react and respond to adverse events. This knowledge could 
then be applied for developing methods and procedures in professional work.
2. Case and context
On Friday, November 26, 2010, the local authorities in the municipality of Östersund, Sweden, 
sent out a message via the emergency alert system urging all people within the city’s freshwa-
ter system to boil the tap-water before drinking or when washing dishes by hand. For a couple 
of weeks several people became ill with upset stomachs supposedly caused by a parasite in 
the fresh water. Three days later, the Swedish Institute for Communicable Disease Control 
verified that the samples of fresh water contained the parasite Cryptosporidium Hominis.
The emergency alert was communicated locally via television and radio, and published on the 
municipality’s web page as well as the national website for emergency information (www.
krisinformation.se). For the following weeks, local news media (radio, television and two 
newspapers) followed the case closely.
Fresh water in Sweden is normally of a very high quality. Good natural resources and strong 
regulation provide a secure delivery of water, drinkable straight from the tap. Östersund 
is no exception, and the local freshwater system, run by the local council, delivers water to 
approximately 50,000 users. Cleaning equipment with ultraviolet light was installed a few 
days before Christmas and all water pipes were flushed. As from February 18, 2011, the fresh 
water was free from Cryptosporidium. The case lasted for 85 days.
Including an estimate of visitors, the parasite caused about 27,000 cases of illness, of which 51 
individuals were hospitalized [16]. This means that almost 50% of the people living or work-
ing within the water supply system became ill. No casualties were reported. The highest rate 
of contagion occurred at the beginning of the period. From mid-December onwards, only a 
few new cases were reported. In addition to the health issues, the outbreak had some adverse 
economic effects; people lost income, organizations suffered from interruptions in produc-
tion, and hotels and the tourist industry had a severe drop in visitors, etc. The total estimate 
of cost to society was around €190 million [16]. Thus, the outbreak was apparently the biggest 
in Europe in modern times.
Two people work regularly at the municipal administration with risk and crisis manage-
ment duties. This work entails compliance assessments, risk and vulnerability analyses, 
emergency planning, exercises, etc. However, these experts are not responsible for man-
aging occurring crises. The different department and a top-level crisis management team 
should instead do that. The top-level team is only activated for large-scale emergencies and 
severe crises. As the outbreak was not formally defined a crisis the team in Östersund was 
not activated.
The healthcare administration is responsible for providing care, support and help to the elderly, 
disabled people and other members of the community who are in need of various forms of 
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support. The administration employs approximately 1400 people. In addition, 25% of care 
services are outsourced to private enterprises. In total, the administration serves about 2500 
caretakers.
The healthcare administration is organized in three levels: an institutional level entailing 
the head of department and a deputy head (strategic issues); a managerial level where the 
division executives are located (executive and administrative issues); and an operative level 
where the care services are concretely delivered (operative issues). The department has five 
geographical divisions, each comprising several units such as housing and residential centers, 
as well as a variety of services. A number of experts, e.g. on information, epidemiology, and 
crisis management work in the central administration supporting all departments.
The main problems that the cryptosporidium outbreak caused for the healthcare administra-
tion was a high amount of sick leave among staff, placing a heightened work burden on the 
staff left and with a lot of temporary staff-partly untrained-called in. A range of practical 
problems concerning water handling was added to the regular work.
3. Theory
To raise the theoretical understanding of this study the analytical framework is developed from 
two bodies of theories. As the healthcare department is organized as an open system with 
loosely coupled units, firstly organization theory on open systems is applied. Secondly, the 
study concerns relational aspects and decision-making within the loosely coupled organization 
during the outbreak, hence issues of trust become important. To this end concepts from theo-
ries of trust are applied in the analysis. The theories are presented in the same order as above.
The perspective of open system views organizations as dynamic, adaptive, open systems that 
need to match the complexity of their environments [17]. Organizational adaption to the envi-
ronment means preparing for and dealing with uncertainties and contingencies, something 
which Lawrence and Lorsch stressed back in 1967 when launching their contingency theory 
[18]. Their model assumes that there is no best way for corporations to organize, lead, or make 
decisions. Instead, organizations have to strike a balance between internal needs and external 
circumstances [19]. This is achieved by structural and cultural differentiation and integration 
[18]: “the more dynamic the environment, the more differentiated the organization needs to 
be; the more differentiated the organization, the more integrative mechanisms there need to 
be” ([20], p. 495).
One way of adapting to the environment is by ‘uncertainty absorption’ [21]. Whenever an 
organization cannot avoid or transfer an uncertainty, for example through insurance, deci-
sion-making needs to be made with bounded rationality. This means that full knowledge of 
the future is either impossible or that the cost permitted of acquiring information in the pres-
ent is limited. When the level of knowledge is believed to be satisfactory (acceptable, though 
not optimal), or when resources are tightened, the uncertainty is considered to be absorbed.
According to March and Simon, uncertainty absorption is frequently used, consciously or uncon-
sciously, as a technique for acquiring and exercising power [21]. Thus, not sharing information 
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can be a means of remaining in power. In crisis management, information is often tremendously 
important. Absorbing uncertainty in a crisis in the way that March and Simon describe, is prob-
ably more often the rule than the exception. Quick decisions have to be made under great uncer-
tainty by constantly judging what is a satisfactory level of knowledge and what is not.
Other systemic theorists have challenged the idea that organizations behave as rationally as 
the contingency theory and bounded rationality approach assumes. Pfeffer and Salancik [22] 
for instance, point to the ‘active agency’ of individual organizations and their leaders where 
they stress the importance of the initiatives of agents. The idea is that in the dependency on 
the exchange of resources between the organization and the environment, the organization 
is not a victim of complex contextual forces, but models its course of action through an active 
agency. In crisis management, the capacity for open, quick exchanges of resources is crucial.
Just like Pfeffer and Salanick, Thompson [23] also addresses ‘active agency’ but also the 
‘sphere of action’ as key elements in dealing with uncertainties. Thompson applies a rather 
cynical view of pure self-interest over discretion. He claims that “individuals exercise dis-
cretion whenever they believe it is to their advantage to do so and seek to evade discretion 
on other occasions” ([23], p. 118). To only stress one-sided, egotistical motives for discretion 
seems rather tendentious. Even though decision making in the midst of a crisis exceeds the 
realm of a manager’s or other staff member’s usual sphere of action [1], it is hard to believe 
that egoism is the most significant or the only guiding compass.
In order to examine the relational aspects within the healthcare organization as an open sys-
tem, some concepts from theories of trust are added. The rationale for choosing trust concepts 
is that the different units within the organization are targeted with expectations. These expec-
tations may come from the caretakers and their akin, the administrative management, the 
public, the news media, and the other units within the organization. The idea is that the health 
care is expected to run regardless of circumstances and that people in Sweden generally put a 
very high trust in the healthcare system.
In particular, two aspects of trust are relevant to apply here: routine (and disrupt from routine) 
and directions. The first one concerns, in this case, the expectation that regular routines will 
apply and that work will continue as usual, in terms of service delivery and decision making, 
even under stressful circumstances. Möllering [24] describes how taken-for-grantedness is a 
basis for action ‘until further notice’ and that faced with uncertainty, routines can enable action 
[25]. In a study particularly relevant for this paper Child and Möllering [26] found that manag-
ers with higher contextual confidence had stronger trust in local staff and that, trust was higher 
when managers had successfully transferred routine practices to the local operations. We can 
thus see that trust and agency have clear connections to routines [27], which we will come back 
to in the results section. The possibility of agency is dependent on the stability, familiarity and 
continuity carried by routines in the sense of regular action patterns and rules [28].
As the study concerns an open system with units at different organizational levels it is important 
to distinguish between different directions of trust. We can distinguish two directions of trust: 
One vertical, which is about power relations and communication between organizational levels, 
and one horizontal, which is about peer collaboration and solidarity [29]. The upwards-directed 
vertical trust has been vastly studied, i.e. the kind of trust employees put in employers or citizens’ 
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trust in institutions [30–33]. Much less research has been conducted on the downwards-directed 
vertical trust, for instance on employers’ trust in employees [34], and companies’ trust in suppli-
ers and customers [35]. Yang [36] though, claims that the downwards directed trust is equally 
important as the upward directed in explaining administrative behavior.
Horizontal trust concerns all kinds of relational networks between people and/or organiza-
tions where there is no formal power involved [29]. At an interpersonal level, there might be 
informal power relations involved emerging from previous interaction between the trustor 
and the trustee. However, these kinds of relations are not examined here, as it would be too 
complex to fit with the empirical study.
Regarding decision making Simmel [37] described how trust involves faith as a basic element. 
Guido Möllering [38] makes a more scientific distinction of this in describing trust as a men-
tal process consisting of expectation, interpretation, and bracketing. The expectation concerns 
the expected results from the choice made, which is the narrow perspective on trust held by 
the rational-choice school. However, the expectation is succeeded by an interpretation of the 
possible results from the different options to choose among. This interpretation is based on 
the normative perspective of the decision maker and based on the values that he/she holds. 
This aspect of trust has lately opened up the former rational explanations of trust to include 
emotions and moral as parameters in trust-related decision-making. Since the interpreta-
tion is always ontologically based, trust has also a suspending function. This means that the 
inherent uncertainty in any decision-making is bracketed; “suspension: the bracketing of the 
unknowable” ([38], p. 417). By this explanation we can see how the combination of interpreta-
tion based on rationality, emotions, and moral, in combination with the bracketing function, 
explains Simmel’s notion of faith as an element of trust.
4. Method
Data collecting consisted of interviews with staff members on different levels of the healthcare 
administration, and with experts in the Cryptosporidium case. To keep the study consistent, 
the only two divisions that were completely within the geographical area of the freshwater 
system were chosen for the study. It was thus possible to focus solely on the disturbances 
from the outbreak without having to consider any internal variations with regard to water 
supply. Three aspects were considered in selecting the care units: The type of accommodation; 
The kind of care takers and their conditions; and The different kinds of care services provided.
Individual interviews were carried out with: the Deputy head of department (IL)1, the Division 
executives (ML1 and ML2), the Head Nurse (CE1), the Municipal security coordinator (CE2), 
and the Healthcare administration information officer (CE3). Group interviews with care staff 
were done as follows: Home care service, 2 interviewees (OL1), Special housing, 4 interview-
ees (OL2), Special housing, 6 interviewees (OL3), Elderly centre, 7 interviewees, of which one 
was head of department (OL4), and Home care service, 3 interviewees (OL5).
1The bracketed abbreviations refer to the quotations in the results section.
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The interviewees were asked questions about the regular processes of risk and crisis manage-
ment at work (e.g. planning, training, communication), and about personal and professional 
experience of other crises and straining situations. Above this they were asked to describe 
how the cryptosporidium case played out for them professionally and personally. The author 
carried out all interviews face-to-face at each workplace. All conversations were recorded. 
Procedures for the interview, data processing, anonymity, and the publication of the results 
were communicated in writing in advance and orally before starting the interviews. All inter-
viewees consented with no objections. The option to opt out before, during, or after the inter-
view was communicated in advance and at the interviews.
4.1. Analysis
Systemic organization theory asserts that an organization is a compound of both formal and 
social elements/structures. The construction of the analytical framework, presented in Table 1, 
is based upon this idea, adding a reflexive trust-dimension of active agency.
Organizational structures precondition how incidents are dealt with in organizations. Three 
elements were identified as being of special significance for handling the Cryptosporidium 
outbreak: crisis management plans, formal roles and responsibilities, and crisis management pro-
cesses. Municipalities in Sweden are obliged to be prepared for crisis management; however, 
the rules of how to do this are open to local application. The organizational structures form a 
baseline for managing adverse events: the formal organizational preparedness.
The formal preparedness of the organization is socially embedded in the everyday work of 
the staff. A range of social structures thus influences how an incident is managed. Four social 
elements that were assumed to be significant in this case were included: individual and col-
lective experiences of crises, social work-relations, work-related knowledge, and informal roles and 
responsibilities. A smooth and effective distribution of crisis management demands a certain 
Organizational structures Plans (documents, prepared crisis management team)
Roles (assigned roles in crises)
Processes (training and exercise, education, involvement)
Social Structures Individual and collective experiences from crises
Work-related knowledge (relevant old and emerging new)
Informal roles and responsibilities
Social work-relations
Active Agency Actions and measures taken
Shifting horizons of action
Creativity/improvisation/innovation
Critical distance and reflection
Table 1. Analytical framework.
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amount of reliance and confidence between colleagues and between organizational levels. As 
such, social structures complement formal preparedness with trust.
This combination is the setting for an active agency. The agency refers both to the concrete 
actions, what the staff do to alleviate the problems arising from the outbreak, and the critical 
distancing of a reflexive subject. ‘Active’ refers to the ability and motivation of individuals 
and small groups for taking action in a given situation. In addition to the concrete actions and 
measures taken, three elements are included: shifting horizons of action, creativity/improvisation/
innovation, and critical distancing and reflection.
The analysis of the transcribed interviews (ca 50,500 words) was carried out through several 
readings in order to identify issues and statements fitting the analytical framework. The con-
tent was then analyzed by using the analytical frame both from a vertical perspective (conse-
quences, actions taken, communication, etc. on the same organizational level) and horizontally 
(consequences, actions taken, communication, etc. between different organizational levels).
5. Results
First a short introduction presents how the message regarding the outbreak was received 
and defined by the interviewees, and how internal communication was handled during the 
outbreak. In addition, some reflections on learning and when the interviewees believed the 
incident was over. The results from the analysis are then presented in a condensed form in 
Tables 2–4. The tables include the observations and issues raised in the interviews, and by the 
findings from the analysis.
Only one of the interviewees found out about the outbreak internally, all the others learned 
through the news media or through friends and relatives. Several of the interviewees even got to 
know from people living outside of Östersund or even abroad. No formal information was sent 
out internally. All available information seems to have been disseminated by word of mouth.
One interview question was “Who defined the incident?” For both the managerial and opera-
tive levels, the answer was quite obvious: the definition came from the top. However, for the 
institutional level, the definition was not at all clear-at least not at the start. At first the process 
of learning about the incident was slow. It basically concerned acknowledging an increase 
in the reported number of sick people. “We got the signals before the peak of the outbreak. I 
think we became aware of this when the figure of reportedly sick people was 500-600” (IL). 
Later on the institutional level took the standpoint that this was not a crisis: “it hasn’t caused 
any crisis or anything” (IL). Despite the slowly emerging character of the event, the large 
numbers of affected people and organizations, and the rather long duration, the outbreak 
was not formally defined as a crisis by top management or experts. Managerial and operative 
levels however had the impression that the institutional level had made such a definition.
Regular meetings were held between heads of departments and experts. No information was 
initially communicated from the central administration to the departments or directly to the care 
staff. Nor was any information communicated from the department to the divisions. Eventually, 
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daily e-newsletters were sent out to all members of the health department. However, by the 
time the information was sent out, the operative staff had already taken initiatives to deal with 
emerging troubles.
“No, I don’t think that we got any information at all really about what we should do. Maybe the district 
nurse told us to boil the water.”
“Yes, but at that time we had already started doing that. It was sort of natural thing to do.” (OL5).
The operative personnel were generally disappointed about the lack of internal information. 
A general observation was that operative personnel share information and solve problems 
informally. For example, they called the hospital for medical advice and other units to ask for 
assisting personnel.
The division executives seemed satisfied with the information. They mainly talked about 
information regarding the parasite, not about organizational issues.
“Since it is a new kind of parasite, that we are not familiar with, there is a risk of rumors emerging […] 
information is very important” (ML1).
“This time it was good information. They sent out updated newsletters regularly from the department” 
(ML2).
Practically all interviewees said they were going to drink the water as soon as the boil notice 
was officially lifted, though some planned to wait longer. At work, there was no intention of 
extending the water restriction longer than necessary. One division executive though, claimed 
that the incident would not be over until an assessment had been made. Some interviewees 
believed that the outbreak was a sign of a permanently changed environment “New parasites 
will surely show up eventually” (OL3), “When is the incident over? Never, it will always be 
present” (OL2).
The security manager planned for an overall assessment and some seminars. None of the 
other interviewees had any intention of collecting experiences from the outbreak.
5.1. Organizational structures
Since the central crisis management team was not activated, the responsibility for handling 
the crisis remained with ordinary management. Managers at both institutional and manage-
rial levels stressed the importance of line management. Even though the division executives 
were responsible for regular fire-protection checks and had emergency plans ready, they did 
not have the knowhow to actually deal with incidents. There should be one person on the 
institutional level working 20% with risk and crisis management specifically for the depart-
ment. However, a recently retired person who was not replaced at the time of the outbreak 
held this position. All managers and experts mentioned this with regret.
Several units had a crisis management plan-stating the minimum staff and duties to be prior-
itized-but in only one interview were the interviewees aware of the plan. Generally, the per-
sonnel expressed uncertainty regarding the plans and procedures for crisis management. All 
employees at an operational level took a mandatory half-day course in fire safety every 3 years 
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but none of them had ever been involved in crisis management planning, training, or exercises. 
Several said that they wanted to be more involved in that kind of work in a practical sense. 
From the experiences of a number of previous deaths among colleagues, due to cancer and 
accidents, a general need for local crisis teams was addressed in two interviews.
Apart from the security manager, the other two experts had not been involved in any prepara-
tion training at all. The head of the central information office had been involved in exercises 
and was responsible for the municipal crisis communication plan, but no one else from the 
healthcare department had been involved.
Institutional level Managerial level Central expert functions Operative level
A parasite outbreak was not a scenario that had 
been planned for.
A central crisis team is assigned for large 
emergencies.
The responsibility for security is shared between the 
department’s security manager, the central security 
manager, and division executives.
Line management is very important.
The department lacks a security manager The 
managers and experts receive training.
The security manager
Responsible for coordinating 
the planning, analyses, 
training, assessments, etc. in 
crisis management.
Was not very involved in 
managing the outbreak.
Plans on conducting an 
evaluation and seminars.
The other two experts
Not involved in plans or 
groups regarding risks and 
crises.
Not involved in exercises, 
security assessments or crisis 
plans.
In the information office, 
only the head takes part in 
exercises.
They have lists of people to 
call in emergencies.
Feel confident about their 
expert roles, but generally 
unsure about crisis 
management.
The department lacks a 
security manager.
Feelings of uncertainty.
Have no emergency/crisis 
instructions.
Regular security (guarding) and 
health workers are outsourced.
All units have regular 
collaborative meetings with 
managers, members of staff, 
union representatives, etc.
The local crisis management 
plans were not applied in the 
outbreak.
The unit manager was identified 
as responsible for giving 
information in the outbreak.
All staff members are also 
responsible but it is difficult to 
define exactly what for.
Have never had any crisis 
training.
All staff members take a half-
day course in fire safety every 
3 years.
Several members of staff would 
like to be more involved.
There is a regular system for 
reporting ill patients.
The department’s 
crisis team = regular 
top management 
(division executives 
and managers at an 
institutional level). This 
group normally meets 
every second week for 
regular work planning.
The ML has a list 
of people to call in 
emergencies.
More reactive than 
proactive crisis work.
Responsible for risk and 
vulnerability analyses 
at the department.
A file for systematic 
fire-protection.
Courses in fire safety.
A regular 24-hour 
emergency duty for 
nurses.
Regular assessments 
and audits of the 
working environment.
Table 2. The outbreak related to organizational structures. Observations and issues brought up in the interviews and 
from the analysis.
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5.2. Social structures
Many employees had worked in the department for a very long time. No interviewee at any 
level though had had any experience of work-related crises. The crisis was similar to the 
annual outbreak of ‘winter vomiting disease’, both in terms of individual symptoms and 
organizational effects. However, the experiences and systems for dealing with the returning 
disease were not applied in the Cryptosporidium case.
All contacts between units at the operative level and between different organizational levels 
seemed to be characterized by informality. The information officer described how new roles 
for the people at the information office were modeled ad-hoc as the outbreak evolved. These 
roles were allocated on a daily basis, and changed from person to person.
The care personnel were in many cases used to dealing with risks in their normal duties. 
There was no point in taking on other informal roles in this case. Practically everyone took on 
the individual responsibility for boiling and distributing water.
I think we are working with that [risks] all the time. I mean, training in using stairs with 
someone who is 80 years old is one hell of a risk. … It’s like a habit so we do not think of it as 
dangerous anymore. (OL5).
From the managerial perspective, a large portion of trust in the staff was expressed. At the 
institutional level, not much was found regarding social structures, maybe because very little 
changed on this level.
Institutional level Managerial level Central expert functions Operative level
The informal nature 
of internal relations 
meant that the 
outbreak was handled 
smoothly.
Need for a role which 
bridges safety and the 
department’s work.
What needed to be done 
was done in an informal 
way.
A high level of trust in 
the staff.
Many people at the 
department have worked 
here for many years.
Despite the long 
experience of staff, the 
outbreak came as an 
unpleasant surprise.
Problems may arise 
differently for private 
enterprises outsourced 
to.
No extra meetings were 
necessary.
Their expertise was 
acknowledged. The need 
for the right skills became 
obvious.
The experts had key roles in 
solving the case.
Modeled ad-hoc roles at 
the information office, 
informally given or 
allocated every morning.
Almost no experience of crises. 
But experienced in dealing with 
risks in everyday work, such as 
supporting the elderly in physical 
training.
At two units, colleagues had died 
of cancer and accidents.
Are very used to dealing with 
problems in their daily work 
in an informal way, either 
independently or in collaboration.
Table 3. The outbreak related to social structures. Observations and issues brought up in the interviews and from the 
analysis.




Only at the institutional level were regular meetings about the outbreak held, at first daily but 
then more sparsely. At a managerial level, almost no action was taken. At an operational level, 
many small adjustments were made such as boiling water, distributing water in small bottles, 
putting up warning signs by the water taps, and talking to patients about the outbreak. All of 
these measures were improvised by the personnel. Some examples of creativity were found 
such as using strong metaphors or images to really drum into dementia patients that the 
water was contaminated. However, there was no collaboration or sharing of knowledge/expe-
riences about the outbreak between units.
Institutional level Managerial level Central expert functions 
(not the security manager)
Operative level
The affected municipal 
departments initially 
had meetings every 
morning, then more 
sparsely later on.
Frequent contact 
between levels during 
the outbreak.
Did not activate the 
central crisis team. 
This team is governed 
by special laws and 
requires special 
organizing.
The effects of the 
outbreak were similar 
to regular stomach 
diseases.
Maintaining the line 
organization was 
important.
No plans for how 
the outbreak might 
have developed (e.g. 
spreading to other 
water systems).
Almost characterized by 
a passive agency.
No meetings or 
communication out of 
the ordinary.
Put great confidence in 
the staff.
Showed great individual 
initiatives.
Did not have any 
instructions to follow but 
had to improvise.
The case was prioritized 
before other duties. Within 
the case, they made 
their own individual 
prioritizations.
Everyone boiled water.
No unit received special deliveries 
of water.
Boiling the water was soon 
incorporated in daily routines.
The water was turned off for 
several patients.
In most accommodation, warning 
signs were put up next to the 
water taps.
Some dementia patients had to be 
warned by using strong images 
(“there is shit in the water”).
The extra tasks took time away 
from other duties, for instance 
boiling water, distributing 
individual bottles to every patient, 
and turning on and off the water.
Most solutions were improvised 
since no instructions were given.
At a couple of units, the outbreak 
was discussed at morning 
meetings.
The outbreak was quite 
straightforward. Common sense 
was enough to deal with it.
Many reflections relating to 
regions with drought or bad 
water, but also their own, local 
vulnerability.
Several interviewees addressed the 
environmental issues related to the 
increased sales of bottled water.
Table 4. The outbreak related to active agency. Observations and issues brought up in the interviews and from the 
analysis.
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Two horizons of action seem to have guided the active agency at an operative level: the safety 
and well-being of the patients, and keeping the working environment as unaffected by the 
outbreak as possible.
The experts clearly acted autonomously. The head nurse did not wait for orders or definitions 
but instantly acted upon the warning alert. She called all nurses at the divisions who were 
working that night, ensuring that all of them got the information. The information officer 
showed some innovative initiatives in setting up a notification system and various ways of 
channeling internal information. However, she stated that the information office in general 
focused much more on the external information to the public, than on internal information 
to the staff.
One significant observation was that the variations in reflections on the outbreak were larger 
and more non-work oriented at the operational levels than at all the other levels (including 
the experts).
6. Discussion
The aim of this paper is to examine how the interplay between trust and the organizational 
setting might influence the framing and management of an uncertain, adverse event at dif-
ferent organizational levels. From an organizational perspective, the outbreak represents an 
almost ideal contingency; it was characterized by a genuine uncertainty regarding causes 
and how to manage and solve the concurrent problems, most inhabitants had never heard of 
the parasite before or knew anything about the effects, the outbreak was a combination of a 
creeping crisis with a slow onset and fast solution and a long shadow crisis with a fast onset 
and lingering consequences [11]. All in all, the outbreak came as a total surprise to everyone, 
and put a lot of strain on both the central municipality administration and on the different 
technical administrations.
As the outbreak had direct effect on the day-to-day operation for each unit, the contamination 
was not possible to avoid or transfer. The units had to deal with it in their everyday work. 
Further, sealing off the water supply was not an option either since the water grid is the same 
for the whole community. Nor was an organizational “siloing” possible because all units were 
affected and the outbreak affected the core work. Therefore, the outbreak and the uncertainty 
had to be integrated with the regular tasks at each unit. Absorption was the only feasible 
alternative of managing the situation.
Throughout the outbreak all operational decisions were made at each unit. Related to Möllering’s 
[40] conceptualization of interpretative trust, this could have led to distinctly differing decisions 
between the units. This however, turned out to not be the case. And even if some small deci-
sions differed, the general outcome of the decision-making seems to be fairly similar. The expla-
nation for this can be that the units are used to operate solitarily in everyday work. Therefore, 
the staffs are used to work toward specific goals regarding the wellbeing of the caretakers. In the 
outbreak, this goal attainment seems to have contributed to a positive outcome by guiding the 
decisions taken by the staffs.
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Thanks to informal relations and an active agency, especially by the care staff at an opera-
tive level and also by the experts, the crisis was quickly adjusted for, and measures for deal-
ing with the outbreak were integrated into everyday work above all through improvisation 
and creativity. Improvisation and creativity are two long-standing terms in crisis research. 
However as with crisis management studies, general existing studies of improvisation tend 
to focus on disasters and large-scale emergencies and on manifest crisis management orga-
nizations, especially with regard to emerging organizations and leadership [39–42]. Much 
less is written on the improvisation of ordinary staff in ordinary organizations facing minor 
emergencies.
Pfeffer and Salancik’s [22] notion of active agency chiefly concerns how organizations can act 
independently in relation to external forces. A general criticism of this notion is that orga-
nizations cannot act, only individuals can. The active agency demonstrated in the outbreak 
is a good example of individual initiatives. A high level of internal trust and a wide indi-
vidual sphere of action seemed to be a decisive precondition for this active agency. This is in 
line with Thompson’s [23] identification of the sphere of action as a key element in dealing 
with uncertainties. If the personnel is expected and encouraged to take initiatives in everyday 
work, it is plausible that they will also do so in a crisis. However, having well-defined limits 
of the sphere of action is a crucial prerequisite. Participation in planning is another way of 
enhancing the capacity of the street-level workers [43].
Although no empirical information was found indicating pure egotistical motives, as pro-
posed by Thompson, it should be mentioned that the operative level had low trust in the 
institutional level. One reason for this could be the reluctance at the institutional and manage-
rial levels to produce and internally disseminate information and instructions. This could be 
interpreted as an example of March and Simon’s description of avoiding information-sharing 
as a power technique [21]. Power was not explicitly mentioned in the interviews, but March 
and Simon do stress that this strategy can be unconscious as well as conscious.
A particularly interesting finding is that the framing of the outbreak differed between the 
organizational levels with regard to time and space (see Figure 1). The institutional level 
talked about previous incidents and exercises within the administration (historical-internal 
focus). The division executives at a managerial level mainly addressed internal issues, but 
were much more future-oriented (future-internal focus). The experts asserted that regaining 
confidence among the clients’ relatives, by the local citizens in general, and by tourists and 
Figure 1. Time-spatial framing of the Cryptosporidium outbreak at different organizational levels.
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visitors (future-external focus) guided their prioritizations during the outbreak. At the opera-
tional level, the reflections and connotations did not concern the work or the local context. 
The issues brought up concerned experiences from around the world such as historic haz-
ards and the struggle with water that many people around the globe deal with every day. 
They also mentioned the environmental consequences of bottled water (historical-external 
focus).
This variation in framings might not be possible to ascribed trust or organizational setting. 
However, the logic behind the framing is assumedly related to the different roles of the 
respondents, and to the immanent perspectives at the different levels. Consequently, there are 
clear organizational influences to this framing. Interestingly, the framings partly contradict 
Thompson’s [23] assertion on the nature of different organizational levels. The operational 
level was not the most closed rational in this case, the institutional level was. On the contrary, 
the operational level took an open adaptive approach, which Thompson reserved for the 
institutional level. In Thompson’s theory, management plays a very active role in mediating 
between levels. In the Cryptosporidium case, such a role was not at all visible.
The self-sufficient units and their solitary decision-making, combined with the variations in 
the framing of the outbreak, highlight the issue of how trust in different directions is char-
acterized. The vertical, power-oriented trust is particularly interesting as it stayed the same 
as under normal circumstances but was charged with new meanings and interpretations 
during the outbreak. A high level of downwards directed trust on the one hand provides the 
units with a large sphere of independency, but is also a way of exercising power by avoiding 
being questioned. The downwards-directed trust did not change during the outbreak but 
increased, or strengthened, i.e. the management continued to trust the staffs just as much or 
even more as in normal circumstances. This was also communicated to the staffs. However, 
from a critical point of view, this acting could be a sign of exercising power and fleeing 
from responsibility. Further, it may put the units under a lot of stress and make them more 
vulnerable.
The upwards-directed trust in the healthcare administration is normally high. The units 
claim that it is liberating under normal circumstances to be free to make their own decisions. 
However, the outbreak was something so out of the normal that it was difficult for the staff to 
know what to do. In the interviews, they stated that they were completely ignorant about the 
parasite, they did not get any instructions or have sufficient training for crises, and the crisis 
plans were not adopted. Caught by surprise, yet acting with creativity and improvisation, 
the staffs seem to have been expecting something more from the management – unclear what 
though. Presumably, the expectations fall back on two main issues: the lack of clear responsi-
bilities and the lack of sufficient training (see Table 3). From a trust perspective, it is therefore 
a bit peculiar that the upwards-directed trust remained. One speculation though is that the 
staff might not want to lose the well-grounded trust once the outbreak was over. By bracket-
ing the uncertainties with small decisions to overcome emerging problems, and by avoiding 
to questioning the management, the staffs secured not to jeopardize their independence. If 
this is true, then the interplay between the upwards-directed and the downwards-directed 
trust seems to facilitate the exercising of power discussed above.




The general conclusions from this case study are that trust and organizational setting influ-
enced the framing and handling of the cryptosporidium outbreak. Especially, the level of 
vertically directed trust established before the outbreak, along with the relatively high inde-
pendence of the different units at operational level was crucial.
Returning to the observations from the introduction on the character of studies in crisis man-
agement, it seems clear that there is a need for developing organizational theory of non-emer-
gency organizations, small-scale events, and the integration of adverse events in the formal 
and social structures of everyday regular work. Existing organization theory and theories from 
crisis management studies can only partly describe the relational aspects of this integration.
The classical organization theories seem to treat only known uncertainties (‘known unknowns’) 
directly related to ordinary work and production. They do not treat genuine uncertainties (‘alien 
externalities’ or ‘unknown unknowns’) or explicitly the management of crises in organiza-
tions. Thus, these theories are not directly applicable to crisis management studies. However, 
since the theories include aspects of contingency and the absorption of uncertainties, they 
are relevant for developing a more specific crisis management theory. Such a theory would 
positively complement existing studies on disaster management and other large-scale events.
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